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 Commissioning of Services by Charities 
in the Th ird Decade of the Contract 
Culture: Lessons Learned (or Not Yet) 
 DEBRA  MORRIS 1 
 I. Introduction 
 Th e question for debate in this chapter is whether Payment by Results (PbR) 
contracts in general, and, in particular, the use of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), are 
an eff ective means by which charities might be funded to deliver public services. 
Such payment mechanisms are becoming increasingly common methods to fund 
charities and other public service providers. Whilst charities might be best placed 
to deliver certain services, the debate will be framed by arguing that inherent risks 
of PbR contracts present signifi cant challenges for them. Th e problems identifi ed 
are particularly acute for smaller charities, which make up the vast majority of the 
charitable sector. Th ere will be a critical assessment of potential solutions intended 
to overcome those challenges, together with analysis of the results of various 
studies of their use. Th ese suggest that a number of those potentially alleviating 
measures do not resolve the diffi  culties that largely remain in place. Discussion of 
the debate question will conclude that, whilst charities are regarded as important 
players in the delivery of public services, 2 the PbR funding environment may well 
prohibit their participation. Whilst this chapter focuses on the UK, which has been 
a pioneer in this area (in developing the fi rst SIB in the world), similar payment 
structures are growing in popularity across the globe and are particularly prevalent 
in Australia and the US. 
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 By way of background, the 1990s saw a marked shift  in the UK from state 
funding for charities through grants, to the awarding of contracts in exchange for 
the provision of services. Th is phenomenon was coined the  ‘ contract culture ’ and 
it brought many problems in its wake, particularly for smaller charities. 3 Early 
empirical research by the author revealed that contract funding relationships 
in practice bore little relevance to theoretical legal analysis of those contracts. 4 
Furthermore, the contracts oft en created legal risks to charities of which the 
 trustees were unaware, as well as threats to charitable independence. 5 Since that 
time, the trend towards service delivery by charities under contract in the UK 
and elsewhere has continued and gathered pace. Th e 2019 Civil Society Almanac 
from National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) reports that, in the 
UK, by 2016 – 17, the sector received  £ 15.8 billion (31 per cent of its total income) 
from government bodies, and the social services subsector continues to receive 
the  largest proportion of income from government (45 per cent). 6 Data produced 
for the 2018 almanac reported that 74 per cent of government income for charities 
was earned through contracts or fees. 7 
 As we approach the third decade of this changed funding environment for 
charities, this chapter will analyse remaining challenges faced by contracting 
charities. Whilst some legal changes have been positive (for example, the crea-
tion of a new legal form for charities, more suited to entering into contractual 
 relationships 8 ), changes in public policy and contract provisions have brought 
additional challenges. It will be seen that the growing infl uence of market incentives 
and commercial principles in social welfare provision are crucial factors aff ecting 
charities. In addition, austerity measures in place since 2010 led to unprecedented 
cuts in public expenditure and increased funding pressures on charities delivering 
front-line public services. Th is is at the same time that charities ’ services are in 
more demand. 
 Contracts with PbR clauses present particular problems for charities and are 
the focus of this debate. Whilst charities can oft en be best placed to deliver the 
desired outcomes, the use of PbR funding models may well exclude them from 
the market. It will be seen that these contracts are simply too risky for charities. 
Th e level of fi nancial risk and the amount of up-front capital required in such a 
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model will therefore inhibit the participation of charities. Many are choosing to 
withdraw from this funding environment, off ered by commissioners on a  ‘ take 
it or leave it ’ basis. Th ose charities that do participate oft en pull out once the full 
level of risk is appreciated. For example, St Mungo ’ s, a large homelessness charity, 
is one of a number of specialist voluntary sector organisations that withdrew from 
the Work Programme, which we will see was funded through PbR contracts. 9 PbR 
contracts may even contribute to the downfall of organisations, such as Eco-Actif 
Services, a small social enterprise in Surrey that helped fi nd work for the hard-
est to employ, which was one of at least four organisations that closed in 2012, 
citing their Work Programme contracts as a major reason in their collapse. 10 More 
recently, the fi nal annual report of a legal advice charity, Advising Communities, 
referred to the fact that it was  ‘ managing an increasingly complicated payment 
on results environment ’, before a later announcement that the charity was being 
placed into liquidation. 11 Finally, the collapse in June 2017 of the Lifeline Project  – 
a drug and alcohol charity with 1,300 employees that had served 80,000 people a 
year  – has been directly linked by its administrators to three PbR contracts with 
diff erent local authorities between August 2015 and January 2016, entered into 
 ‘ without undertaking the necessary due diligence and [failing] to realise that the 
targets set were unachievable ’. 12 
 Th ese examples of charities and other third sector organisations, with the skills 
and experience necessary to solve current social problems, either withdrawing 
from the provision of service or ceasing to exist due to the funding environment, 
raise signifi cant policy issues. Smaller, newer charities, that may nevertheless have 
the appropriate specialist expertise to provide public services, are oft en excluded 
from the market entirely. 13 Not only do charities miss out on the opportunity 
to participate in the delivery of welfare services, but would-be benefi ciaries are 
deprived of the potentially innovative capacity 14 of the charitable sector. New and 
emerging providers, with the potential to disrupt the market, are not enabled to 
participate. It will be seen, for example, that specifi c contract forms encourage the 
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participation of the largest, most established, providers. As noted in the 2018 Civil 
Society Strategy: 15 
 Th e commissioning model which applies in many of our public services, including 
the services commissioned by local authorities, oft en favours large companies who are 
better able to navigate complex commissioning systems, bid aggressively (including 
with  “ loss leader ” bids to take more of the market), and who can carry the fi nancial risk 
passed on by commissioners to providers. 
 Th e mixed economy of providers, an essential element to provide choice and 
encourage innovative approaches to long-standing problems, is diffi  cult to achieve. 
When considering the diffi  culties experienced by small charities, it is important to 
note that these aff ect the vast majority of organisations that make up the charitable 
sector. Over 85 per cent of registered charities in England and Wales have a turn-
over of under  £ 500,000. 16 
 Th is chapter will explore the increasingly popular but risky PbR model. It will 
look at some potential solutions that could reduce charities ’ exposure, in particular 
SIBs. Th ese are a particular form of commissioning tool aimed at enabling organi-
sations to deliver PbR contracts. With a SIB, social investors pay for the project at 
the start, and then receive payments based on the results achieved by the project. 
Th is chapter will analyse research fi ndings on SIBs ’ usage that suggest little  effi  cacy 
at solving the problems identifi ed. In short, the thrust of the argument is that 
whilst there is much political support for PbR, evidenced in a number of initiatives 
intended to enhance its use, existing mechanisms do not make the inherently risky 
PbR environment safe for charities. PbR contracts are not therefore conducive to 
charities ’ participation in the provision of public services. 
 Th e next section will illustrate how this increasingly common commissioning 
model works and will begin a critical examination of the implications of its use for 
charities. 
 II. Payment by Results 
 Contracts containing clauses that allow for PbR have become more prevalent 
in the last decade. Th is means that charities providing welfare and other social 
services may be funded based on the prescribed and measured outcomes (results) 
achieved for a target population (for example, getting unemployed people back 
into work) rather than the services provided (for example, running job clubs). With 
PbR, fi nancial rewards are dependent on the delivery of results, so that the state 
pays for services only if they are perceived to  ‘ work ’ by reference to pre-defi ned 
expected outcomes. If, for any reason, the provision of service does not result in 
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outcomes defi ned as success, the provider of the service (be it a commercial entity 
or a charity) bears the consequences. Th is helps to cut wasteful public spending 
by transferring fi nancial risk to the provider. However, when the provider of the 
service happens to be a charity, it is charitable funds that are eff ectively wasted. 
 PbR was introduced in UK welfare provision in 2009 as part of the Labour 
Government ’ s Flexible New Deal 17 programme for the unemployed 18 and its use 
has increased in recent years. As part of the UK Coalition Government ’ s wider 
reforms to public services, set out in the Cabinet Offi  ce ’ s 2011 White Paper, the 
virtues of PbR were extolled: 19 
 Open commissioning and payment by results are critical to open public services  … 
Payment by results will build yet more accountability into the system  – creating a direct 
fi nancial incentive to focus on what works, but also encouraging providers to fi nd better 
ways of delivering services. 
 Th e previously documented problems for charities working within the contract 
culture are exacerbated by the introduction of clauses in those contracts provid-
ing for PbR. Legal analysis of PbR contract terms undertaken on behalf of 
NCVO and involving providers from voluntary, community and social enterprise 
 organisations 20 found similar results to previous research on the contract culture 
in general. Conclusions, which mirror earlier fi ndings on PbR, include: contracts 
are designed without consultation on a  ‘ take it or leave it ’ basis; charities are not 
seeking legal advice before signing up; and, contract terms and reality of practice 
are not in line with each other. Many of these issues are inherited from previous 
poor contracting practice and are due to the absence of charity providers in the 
crucial early design, commissioning and negotiation stages of contracting. 21 Aft er 
over two decades of public service commissioning, this is very disappointing. 
 One potential advantage of the shift  in risk towards the provider in PbR is that 
this should be refl ected in the contract terms, which should be less prescriptive 
around the specifi cs of service delivery. Where charity providers are being paid 
for the results achieved, as opposed to services provided, charities should be free 
to deliver appropriate interventions so as to secure the agreed outcomes. It should 
not be necessary, for example, to specify in the contract that the  commissioner 
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is to be notifi ed in advance of any changes to the charity personnel involved in 
the  delivery. However, research has found such provisions within contracts 
 examined. 22 Th is was oft en found to be the case where pre-existing contracts have 
simply been re-tendered as  ‘ re-badged ’ PbR contracts with new payment terms, 
but all the delivery terms remained the same as they were previously. 
 It might be considered that another benefi t of PbR terms is that they may 
facilitate innovations in terms of methodologies adopted and interventions made. 
However, research shows that many PbR contracts have been used to further 
develop or scale up existing programmes that have a proven track record of success, 
rather than to encourage experimental work. For example, an international study 
tested the innovative nature of 22 worldwide PbR schemes, funded through SIBs, 
and found that more than half of the examined schemes funded the expansion of 
an existing programme or the implementation of a programme already proved to 
be successful. 23 
 Government now has a growing portfolio of PbR schemes including for the 
provision of welfare, housing and criminal justice, where payment depends, at 
least in part, on the provider achieving specifi ed outcomes. A 2015 National Audit 
Offi  ce (NAO) report identifi ed 52 programmes across six central government 
departments 24 with PbR elements to their funding, worth around  £ 15 billion. 25 
Despite this, the effi  cacy of outcome-based commissioning is still questionable. A 
literature review of over 90 studies of worldwide PbR contracts (covering the UK, 
Australia and US) concluded that  ‘ there is a consensus that the evidence base is 
not able to give a clear indication as to whether payment by results works ’. 26 One 
of the reasons for the lingering uncertainty is that results are oft en to be achieved 
over a long period of time. With SIBs, for example, few have produced their fi nal 
outcomes. It will be seen that although there are several reviews that summarise 
the performance of these bonds, they are based on a relatively small number of 
cases and they generally off er only provisional or interim fi ndings. 
 III. Th e Challenges of PbR Contracts for Charities 
 In responding to the debate question posed at the start of this chapter, the next four 
sections will tease out some of the specifi c challenges that are presented to charities 
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when faced with PbR contracts, supporting the view that they are not conducive to 
charities ’ participation in the provision of public services. Th ese focus on: risks of 
PbR; costs associated with PbR; the impact on benefi ciaries; and problems around 
measurements of results in PbR contracts. 
 A. Charity Trustees ’ Duties and Risk 
 Legal obligations around management of risk have specifi c resonance for charity 
trustees when considering entering into PbR contracts and may well deter their 
participation. 
 Charity trustees must comply with a duty of prudence which requires them to 
act responsibly, reasonably and honestly. 27 As part of this duty, they must ensure 
that their charities ’ assets are used only to support or carry out their charitable 
purposes, and they must avoid exposing their assets, benefi ciaries or reputation 
to undue risk. Whilst risk is an everyday aspect of most charities ’ work, especially 
those providing contracted services, PbR contracts introduce additional elements 
of risk. As there is no guarantee of payment, charities will incur expenditure with-
out the certainty of receiving income through the contract to off set it. It will be 
seen that this element of uncertainty is not susceptible to control by the charity 
provider. 
 Charity trustees, as part of their eff ective governance of their charities, 
must consider the appropriate levels of risk to adopt and put measures in place 
to manage those risks. 28 Trustees of charities over the audit threshold 29 must 
report on the major risks to which the charity is exposed, confi rming that they 
have  ‘ satisfi ed themselves that systems or procedures are established in order to 
manage those risks ’. 30 Charities that are incorporated under company law (other 
than small companies, as defi ned by company law) must prepare a strategic 
report, and this must contain a description of the principal risks and uncertain-
ties facing the company, together with an explanation of how they are managed or 
 mitigated. 31 Th e trustees of smaller charities with gross income below the statutory 
audit threshold are also advised to make a risk management statement as a matter 
of good practice. 32 Th e regulator of charities in England and Wales, the Charity 
Commission, considers that  ‘ major risks ’ are those that  ‘ have a major impact and 
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a probable or highly probable likelihood of occurring ’. 33 If they occurred, they 
would have a major impact on some or all of the following areas: governance; 
operations; fi nances; environmental or external factors such as public opinion 
or relationship with funders; or a charity ’ s compliance with law or regulation. 
 Unfortunate examples exist to suggest that failure of PbR contracts may well fall 
within this category. 34 
 Although fi nancial experience and risk appetite may well vary amongst char-
ity trustees, the vast majority of charity trustees are volunteers 35 with strong 
emotional links to the charitable cause, leading them to err on the side of caution 36 
when it comes to taking fi nancial risks. Th e duty of prudence, together with the 
public benefi t requirement that all charities must satisfy, 37 underpin the charity 
governance model and may mean that PbR fi nancing and the risks that it entails 
are diffi  cult for charity trustees to accept. 38 
 B. Financial Cost of PbR Contracts 
 Th e prevalence of low reserves across the charitable sector oft en means that 
charities cannot aff ord to enter into PbR contracts, due to the particular funding 
structures and fl ows that are involved in such contracts. 
 With PbR there is a delay between the provision of the service and the ability of 
the commissioner to determine whether the required results have been achieved. If 
payments are deferred for too long, this gap can undermine the fi nancial viability 
of the service provider, with the risk of insolvency. Th is means that charity provid-
ers oft en have to cross-subsidise their PbR work or seek loans to cover cash fl ow 
issues caused by delay in payments. 39 Many charities simply do not have the means 
to sustain their activities until delayed payments are made. Charities tend to have 
low reserves, so it is unlikely that many will be able to draw on them for such 
purposes. In fact many charities, especially smaller ones, operate with no reserves 
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at all, 40 and research commissioned by the Charity Commission in 2018 41 revealed 
that few larger charities even appear to fully understand what their reserves are or 
how to disclose them correctly. 42 Many seemed to assume that their charity had 
more unrestricted funds available to draw on than was in fact the case, particularly 
where signifi cant amounts of funds were tied up in buildings. A separate survey 
in the same year 43 found that the 157 best-known charities (in a Charity Brand 
Index) had an average of four months ’ worth of spending in reserves. With long-
term PbR contracts, this would not be suffi  cient to bridge the gap. In addition, the 
very nature of reserves is that they may be needed in the short to medium term 
and therefore trustees should ensure that they are readily realisable as cash, when 
needed. 44 Th is would suggest that they should not be tied up long term in support-
ing PbR contracts. 
 Delivery of service (and consequent achievement of outcomes) is sometimes 
impossible due to referral volumes to charities diff ering from those originally 
anticipated when PbR contracts are signed and charities ’ budgets are calculated. 
For example, referrals to charities to provide services in the Work Programme, 
discussed further below, were consistently lower than originally forecast, 45 
supporting the view that smaller charities are simply  ‘ bid candy ’ used by the 
main contractor (oft en a commercial entity) to improve the attractiveness of their 
tender. 46 If charities do not receive referrals under PbR contracts, they will not 
get paid. One civil society organisation has described signing a 140-page-long 
contract only to have received no referrals at the time of the report. 47 
 In the previous section, it was noted that charity trustees have a requirement 
to be prudent with charity funds. Th is can mean that charities choose to stick with 
tried and tested methods of delivery rather than to take on the fi nancial risk asso-
ciated with innovative models. In a survey of providers in 2014, over 80 per cent 
surveyed reported concerns about fi nancial risk from PbR contracts. 48 Research-
ers noted that social sector providers (including charities) were  ‘ especially 
concerned about these dynamics undermining their ability to innovate through 
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building close relationships with citizens and communities ’. 49 A 2013 survey 50 
found that 42.1 per cent of voluntary sector provider respondents believed (as did 
28.2  per  cent of local authority respondents) that the capital requirements and 
fi nancial risks involved  ‘ completely ’ limited their capacity to compete for PbR 
contracts. Th e NAO report on PbR 51 also referred to evidence 52 of smaller welfare-
to-work providers withdrawing from contracts due to the time lag between 
investment and payment. 
 PbR models may therefore present challenges to charities which mean that 
they cannot participate. Th is is particularly the case for small charities that may 
lack access to reserves or working capital to be able to invest in delivering a service 
upfront prior to receiving the funding. 
 C. Impact on Benefi ciaries 
 When charity providers are more concerned about how they report their results, 
in order to be paid via their contracted terms, or when certain benefi ciaries come 
with more of a  ‘ cost ’ than others, charitable benefi ciaries may well lose out. 
 Lowe and Wilson argue that outcomes-based monitoring turns the perfor-
mance management of social interventions into a simplifi ed game, which does not 
deal well with complex realities. 53 Instead of serving the needs of their benefi ciar-
ies who, as human beings, lead complex real-world lives, charity providers may 
focus their eff orts on how to produce the necessary performance information. 
Th e clear need to evidence results can mean that needs of benefi ciaries are almost 
secondary for the charity providers. 
 Th is may also mean that charities concentrate their activity on areas where 
outcomes are easily measurable. 54 Th is may explain why some PbR programmes 
have reported good outcomes. An empirical study of an Australian local non-profi t 
organisation, whose youth services provision was funded through a PbR contract, 
sums up the situation well in the report of an interview with a staff  member: 55 
 It ’ s constantly looking at numbers. Yeah, and the quality and depth of the client contact 
has really declined in the last couple of months because of the pressure of the new data 
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provider-led pathways to work ,  Research Report No 638 ( Department for Work  & Pensions ,  2010 )  ch 5 . 
  59  Th e payment structure is summarised in Department for Work  & Pensions,  Th e Work Programme 
(Department for Work  & Pensions, 2012)  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/49884/the-work-programme.pdf . 
  60  See, eg,  E  Carter and  A  Whitworth ,  ‘ Creaming and Parking in Quasi-Marketised Welfare-to-Work 
Schemes: Designed Out Of or Designed In to the UK Work Programme ? ’ [ 2015 ]  Journal of Social 
Policy   277 . 
  61  See below where the use of sub-contractors in PbR contracts is considered. 
and monitoring requirements. We don ’ t get the funding unless we meet the targets. It ’ s 
really changed the way we work. 
 In what the authors describe as  ‘ taming social justice practice ’ they note that 
 ‘ intra-action with RBA [results-based accountability] performance measurement 
practices risks translating quality into only quantity ’. 56 
 Th e level of monitoring required might be higher than when entering into 
regular contracts, adding to the costs of participation. An in-depth study of four 
UK SIBs found that some third sector stakeholders were of the view that the degree 
of micro-management built into the contract was actually reducing their fl exibility 
to autonomously pursue their social mission. 57 Some felt that the resources and 
time that went into these additional forms of performance management and meas-
urement could be better spent on front-line services. 
 It can also mean that certain benefi ciaries are more likely to be helped than 
others. With such a focus on meeting targets, there is a temptation to  ‘ game ’ the 
system, with PbR contracts leading to some classes of charities ’ benefi ciaries being 
left  behind so that the  ‘ easier ’ targets can be pursued. For example, under the Work 
Programme (which replaced the Flexible New Deal), where 80 per cent of the 
budget was linked to PbR, it has proved most lucrative to target young unem-
ployed people, who pick up skills quickly, rather than focusing on harder-to-help 
claimants, particularly those furthest from the labour market, such as those aged 
over 50 and disabled people. Contractors spent less on people in these groups, 58 
with some being neglected, despite the fact that the diff erential payment model 59 
off ered providers higher payments for achieving job outcomes for those considered 
harder to help.  ‘ Creaming and parking ’ describes the situation where providers 
prioritise certain service recipients because they believe them to be easier to help 
and therefore most likely to deliver a fi nancial return in a PbR model. 60 At the same 
time, those service recipients least likely to achieve a desired outcome, because 
their needs are too costly and complex to address, are  ‘ parked ’ by giving them 
minimum attention or passing them on to other organisations within a supply 
chain. 61 Benefi ciaries who need the most help may not get it, even where payment 
tariff  structures seek to incentive personalised attention, by refl ecting the cost to 
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at HMP Peterborough ( Ministry of Justice ,  2011 )  36 . 
  64  See, eg,  N  McHugh et al,  ‘ Social Impact Bonds: A Wolf in Sheep ’ s Clothing ? ’ [ 2013 ]  Journal of 
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 providers of achieving successful interventions. Each benefi ciary has a price  – 
those for whom a positive  ‘ result ’ is more likely (for example, those who volunteer 
to benefi t from the service provision or those who may have achieved the desired 
outcome without support) are much more valuable to the charity provider than 
those with greater or more complex needs (for example, those for whom engage-
ment with the service is compulsory) for whom such a  ‘ result ’ will be harder to 
achieve. Charities that want to provide personalised attention to the most vulner-
able may well struggle to adapt to provision funded through PbR, where they 
may be forced to  ‘ cherry pick ’ those benefi ciaries who are least expensive to help. 
NCVO ’ s survey of Work Programme sub-contractors found that 13 out of 98 had 
to  ‘ park ’ service users because the cost of the intervention exceeded the payment, 
and of the 78 that stated that they had not  ‘ parked ’ service users, 35 had to subsi-
dise delivery from their own reserves. 62 Th e same research found that 29 out of 
98 respondents believed that service users who would have benefi tted from their 
expertise were not being referred to them. 
 Th e particular structure of funding, with the explicit focus on reportable 
results, therefore means that charities providing services through PbR may not be 
able to prioritise the needs of their benefi ciaries. 
 D. Measurement and Linkage 
 In principle, a shift  from the somewhat blunt instrument of target-driven outputs 
to outcomes is welcome. However, social outcomes are notoriously diffi  cult to 
measure. Even if outcomes are measurable, there is also a question around linkage. 
 One challenge in the Peterborough Social Impact Bond, to be discussed later, 
was generating a  ‘ methodologically robust outcome measure, which had the confi -
dence of all stakeholders ’. 63 Outcomes will rarely be achieved via one specifi c 
intervention. In reality, success or failure will be due to a diverse range of inter-
related reasons, many of which may well be beyond the control of a specifi c service 
provider. PbR contracts tend not to refl ect this inability of providers to have eff ec-
tive control over many of the external factors that determine whether or not a 
result is achieved. 64 Th e payment metrics upon which all PbR programmes depend 
are necessarily simplifi ed top-down targets which force providers to ignore the 
complex and messy lives of the real people with whom they work. Th e provider 
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may well retain considerable risks for outcomes that it is unable to control. For 
example, an unemployed person using a PbR employment service may contempo-
raneously benefi t from housing and health services. Th e quality of the provision 
of the combination of these services will have an impact on the person ’ s ability to 
secure employment. Th is means attribution of outcomes to the provision of specifi c 
services is diffi  cult to achieve, making the real success of the contracted provision 
impossible to judge. Th e necessarily long duration of some PbR contracts makes 
this linkage even more diffi  cult to determine. Th e 2015 NAO Report 65 concluded 
that PbR should only be used where results can be measured and attributed to 
providers ’ interventions. 
 Whilst there is some support for the eff ectiveness of outcomes-based perfor-
mance management, 66 it is questionable, in particular where the provider is 
a charity, whether PbR should be used in diffi  cult, real-life situations, where 
outcomes are the product of complex, inter-related factors, most of which are 
beyond the control or infl uence of any specifi c programme and its contracted 
providers. 
 IV. Structural Alleviating Measures 
for Charities Entering into PbR Contracts 
 A number of challenges of PbR contracts, which support the argument that PbR 
contracts are not conducive to charities ’ participation in the provision of public 
services, have been examined. In order to fully consider the debate question 
further, the next two sections will explore the impact of certain enabling mecha-
nisms built into PbR contract structures, which may help charities to overcome 
these hurdles. Whilst each mechanism could be seen as a potential enabler for 
the further involvement of charities and smaller providers in PbR contracts, close 
examination will question whether or not this is borne out in practice. It will be 
seen that each mechanism has not provided a panacea but has brought its own 
specifi c challenges. 
 A. Th e Use of Sub-Contractors in PbR Contracts 
 One enabling feature of PbR contracts, that may support the involvement of chari-
ties in the delivery of service, at least in theory, is the way in which many large PbR 
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schemes use a range of providers to deliver services. Th is means that some organi-
sations, including small charities, may be able to participate in such arrangements 
through a chain as a sub-contractor. For example, under the Work Programme, the 
Department for Work  & Pensions (DWP) contracted with large  ‘ prime ’ providers, 
who in turn passed work onto smaller sub-contractors (oft en smaller charitable 
providers). DWP estimated that in September 2013, there were 858 organisa-
tions acting as sub-contractors for the 40 Work Programme contracts, and 363 
(42 per cent) came from the voluntary or community sector. 67 
 However, the challenges discussed previously may well be felt even more 
acutely by charity sub-contractors, who are beholden to a larger organisation 
which is the primary contractor with the direct link to the commissioner. As one 
 ‘ social sector ’ 68 provider put it:  ‘ I would never sub-contract with a government 
prime contractor as they appear money driven and not socially driven ’. 69 
 Th e level of the risk in PbR contracts is usually designed at scale, but there is 
evidence to suggest that prime contractors are oft en not absorbing any of the risk 
and are simply passing down the terms of the head contract to sub-contractor 
charities in the supply chain. 70 Th is risk then becomes disproportionate, as each 
required result involves a higher level of fi nancial risk the further down the chain it 
passes. To take one example, complex data reporting requirements may be accept-
able for the prime contractor, but they may be disproportionate or unmanageable 
for sub-contractors without the appropriate resource. 
 Research exploring the infl uence of outcome-based contracting upon the 
delivery of the Pathways to Work programme found an imbalance of power in 
prime provider and supply chain relationships, leading to  ‘ creaming ’ of clients: 71 
 Th e common prime provider strategy was, broadly speaking, to focus on job ready 
clients and encourage supply chain focus on clients requiring more intensive support 
and assistance to return to work. 
 Th is is despite the fact that government requires prime providers working with 
the DWP to comply with the  ‘ Merlin Standard ’. Th e 2018 refreshed standard is 
built upon eight fundamental and integrated principles 72 and within each prin-
ciple there are a number of criteria which provide a structured, professional and 
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 engaging approach to achieving excellence in supply chain management. Th e aim is 
to support the development, recognition and promotion of sustainable excellence, 
and positive partnership working within supply chains. For sub-contractors, there 
is an expectation of working in an environment and culture of respect, honesty, 
transparency and mutual support. When prime contractors are engaged in cream-
ing and parking clients, this is inconsistent with the Merlin Standard ethos. 
 Charities also need to carefully consider the status of the prime contractor, 
including its reputation, working methods, ethos and track record, before agree-
ing to enter into such relationships. 73 Legal duties of charity trustees require them 
to act with care to protect their charities ’ assets, reputation and benefi ciaries, all 
of which could be damaged, should there be adverse publicity around the prime 
contractor and its association with charity sub-contractors. 
 Whilst the use of sub-contracting arrangements in PbR contracts may facilitate 
involvement by charity providers, it has been seen that charities ’ participation in 
this capacity may also exacerbate some of the problems surrounding PbR contracts 
which have been considered above. 
 B. SIBs as a Way of Funding PbR Contracts 
 It has been seen that in PbR contracts a charity must use its own money to front up 
the costs of providing its contracted service, in the hope that, eventually, outcomes 
from its service provision will generate payments to cover the costs. If commis-
sioners are keen to attract smaller enterprises and charity providers as bidders, 
they may need to consider a source of social investment to run alongside the PbR 
contract. One way in which government has sought to support charity participa-
tion in PbR contracts is through the encouragement of the use of social bonds 
which transfer the fi nancial risk of deferred or non-payment away from chari-
ties, on to third party social investors. Social bonds (or social investment/impact 
bonds   – generally known as SIBs) are a form of PbR contract which leverage 
private investment so that providers (including charities) do not have to front the 
cost of delivery and bear the risk of non-payment through failure to achieve the 
pre-defi ned outcomes. 
 By way of a SIB, private non-government social investors provide the upfront 
capital to set up services under a PbR contract, and they are paid back if and when 
payment is made for the social outcomes achieved as a result of the contracted 
service provision. In this way, the investors bear the fi nancial risk of failure, not 
the charities and other service providers. If a charity ’ s contracted provision results 
in improved social outcomes, this leads to savings for government (which will not 
need to pay for services that would otherwise be used by individuals with poor 
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social outcomes) and wider benefi ts to the community. Th ere may well be a direct 
link between provision and cost saving; for example, where charity provision 
prevents a released prisoner re-off ending, the re-imprisonment costs are saved. 
In other situations, savings are based on less defi ned cost savings brought about by, 
for example, an estimated contribution to a longer-term reduction in crime. Th e 
government agrees to pay a proportion of these savings back to the investors as a 
return on their investment, where payments for results exceed running costs and 
bond repayments. 
 While current data on investors is limited, a 2017 report noted that every 
UK SIB that had published information on outside investment has received some 
(or all) of that investment from either philanthropic trusts and foundations or via 
government-backed social investment funds. 74 
 For investors that are charities themselves, a SIB off ers a  ‘ blended return ’ that is 
a potential fi nancial return on investment that may not be as high as other possible 
returns, but one which is  ‘ mission-aligned ’, allowing them to fulfi l their charitable 
aims by investing in an area that fi ts with their specifi c charitable mission. In other 
cases, investors may be private investors with a social conscience or even simply a 
private profi t motive. Th rough what can be described as the privatisation of social 
policy, fi nancial institutions such as JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs and consult-
ing fi rms such as Deloitte, KPMG and McKinsey  & Co have all been involved in 
SIBs. 75 For example, in the US, Goldman Sachs was a pioneer investor in the SIB 
concept. 76 Th rough the private sector funding charities to provide services in this 
way, a profi t incentive is introduced, and some of the public sector savings (or 
 ‘ profi t ’ ) from successful programmes will revert to private sector investors. In this 
way, public money is diverted into private hands. 
 If positive results are not achieved and payment is not forthcoming from the 
public sector commissioner to the charity, it is the investor that does not recoup its 
expenditure, not the charity. Th e fi nancial return is tied to agreed outcomes laid 
down in the contract at the start of the bond issue. Whilst these are commonly 
called bonds, SIBs do not have a guaranteed rate of return, in line with the conven-
tionally understood fi nancial defi nition of a bond. 77 
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evaluation report ( Ministry of Justice ,  2015 )  1 . 
  81  J  Anders and  R  Dorsett ,  HMP Peterborough Social Impact Bond  – cohort 2 and fi nal cohort impact 
evaluation ( National Institute of Social and Economic Research ,  June 2017 ) . 
  82  Social Finance,  ‘ World ’ s 1st Social Impact Bond shown to cut reoff ending and to make impact 
investors a return ’, press release (Social Finance, 27 July 2017). 
 Th e fi rst worldwide pilot SIB was the Peterborough SIB, established in 2010 
by the Ministry of Justice and supported by the Big Lottery Fund to provide 
for ex-off enders who had been released from Her Majesty ’ s Prison (HMP) 
 Peterborough aft er short prison sentences of less than one year. 78 Th e aim was 
to break the cycle of off ending by off ering personal support to ex-off enders so 
that they could reintegrate into society. 79 It was a modest scheme but very impor-
tant as a pilot. It was originally intended to run until 2017, funding the delivery, 
largely by charities, of the One Service scheme to work with three cohorts of 
around 1,000 released prisoners. However, this plan was overtaken by events; the 
 roll-out of a new national statutory programme  – Transforming Rehabilitation  – to 
reform probation services for all short-sentenced off enders in the UK would have 
resulted in duplication of service and the inability to measure the impact of the 
SIB-funded provision against a control group. While the pilot operated through a 
PbR contract for the fi rst two cohorts of released prisoners, the third cohort was 
supported by a fee-for-service arrangement, paid by the Ministry of Justice, rather 
than under the original SIB-funded PbR model. 80 Th e SIB was coordinated by 
Social Finance, a not-for-profi t fi nancial intermediary, which obtained investment 
funding of around  £ 5 million from 17 private individuals and charities. A return 
on investment was to be paid if a minimum threshold of a 7.5 per cent reduc-
tion in reconviction events was reached across the pilot, compared to a matched 
control group. Additionally, there was an option to trigger an early payment if a 
10 per cent reduction was noted in the number of reconviction events in indi-
vidual cohorts. Ultimately, the reduction across both cohorts was estimated to be 
9 per cent, 81 so the outcome payment was triggered and investors received a single 
payment representing their initial capital plus a return of just over 3 per cent per 
annum for the period of investment. 82 Th e returns were paid out of the savings that 
arose from the reduction in the costs associated with recidivism. 
 From this narrative, SIBs appear to have great potential as a mechanism for 
involving charities in PbR contracts. SIBs may enable improvements in social 
outcomes by aligning the priorities of public sector commissioners, charities and 
socially motivated investors around a common goal, which is the better delivery 
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 November 2017 ) . 
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and  J  Emerson (eds),  Social Finance ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2015 )  362 . 
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the outcome metrics used within UK SIBs up to 2018. 
  88  H  Azemati et al,  ‘ Social Impact Bonds: Lessons Learned So Far ’ [ 2013 ]  Community Development 
Investment Review  23, 27 . 
  89  F  Sheil and  R  Breidenbach-Roe ,  Payment by Results and the voluntary sector ( NCVO ,  April 2014 )  12 . 
of social interventions for the public good. However, a closer examination again 
reveals that a potentially enabling mechanism for charities is not without its 
own challenges. One of the main diffi  culties is caused by the complexity of the 
 structures surrounding a SIB. 
 SIBS are technically extremely complicated, involving contractual arrange-
ments and fi nancial instruments which are resource-intensive to set up, 83 leading 
to high transaction costs. Oft en the creation of a SIB has included the creation of a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to manage the activity covered by the SIB contract. 84 
Th e SPV may be owned by investors, intermediaries or delivery organisations  – 
or sometimes a combination of all three. 85 A case study of the Peterborough SIB 
concluded: 86 
 [T]he costs of establishing the necessary metrics,[ 87 ] baselines, legal arrangements and 
fi nancial calculations are sometimes so high that the SIB is infeasible without additional 
funding. 
 Th e overhead costs of the SIB fi nancing mechanism, including legal fees, interme-
diary costs, evaluation expenses and costs associated with investor due diligence, 
are primarily fi xed costs and will constitute a smaller proportion of the total 
project as the size of the intervention grows. Th erefore, in one US study 88 it was 
suggested that generally these costs will only be worth incurring for a SIB contract 
worth at least US $ 20 million. Due to their necessary scale, the SIBs that have 
existed so far have tended to involve larger, rather than small, charities. Many of 
the latter will neither be familiar with nor have the necessary skills to deal with 
complex contracts. NCVO has identifi ed that the skills required to engage in PbR 
contracting will include: improved understanding of costs, margins and pricing; 
complex modelling tools; understanding of the cost and process of acquiring 
capital and an ability to make a compelling case to funders; an ability to identify, 
assess and mitigate risk; and, greater analysis of investment and asset management 
opportunities. 89 
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  92  D  Edmiston and  A  Nicholls ,  ‘ Social Impact Bonds: Th e Role of Private Capital in Outcome-Based 
Commissioning ’ [ 2018 ]  Journal of Social Policy  57, 73 . 
 Th ere is also an added dimension in the inevitably complex contracting 
arrangements that SIBs entail, and that is the involvement of an investor in the 
relationship and the inescapable introduction of a profi t incentive into the equa-
tion, particularly where private for-profi t investors are involved. Th e concerns 
expressed earlier about the impact of PbR arrangements on benefi ciaries may be 
exacerbated. As well as the charity provider serving the commissioning master, 
there is also the investor to be considered. Th e chances of the service users  – the 
charities ’ benefi ciaries  – having a voice in any discussions around service provision 
are even less than usual. Th is time, accountability and reporting systems are likely 
to be focused on the needs of the private investors rather than the public commis-
sioners. Ideologically, it could be argued that SIBs support the wider agenda of 
public sector reform, the privatisation of social policy, and the marketisation of 
charities. 
 Despite the concerns outlined above, by July 2018, 45 SIBs had been launched 
in the UK to address diverse social problems in areas such as criminal justice, 
homelessness, health, educational underachievement, and long-term unemploy-
ment. Th ere are over 100 worldwide. 90 Th ese tackle complex social issues such as 
refugee employment support, loneliness among the elderly, rehousing and reskill-
ing homeless youth, and diabetes prevention. 91 Bearing in mind the drawbacks of 
SIBs, the question remains as to whether they may nevertheless support the deliv-
ery of better social interventions. An in-depth study of four UK SIBs examining 
the eff ect of the introduction of private capital in outcome-based commissioning 
concluded that: 92 
 [T]here is, at present, very little defi nitive evidence to suggest that services funded 
through such a mechanism lead to any relative improvement in social outcomes 
compared to more conventional PbR commissioning models. In great part, this is due 
to the poor availability and standards of evidence that are currently available, and the 
challenges associated with accurately identifying the attainment and cause of complex 
social outcomes over time. However, where there is evidence available, it is rather mixed. 
 A further potential disadvantage of charity involvement in SIB-funded schemes is 
that they have tended to attract media attention due to their political sensitivity or 
novelty or size. Th is was especially the case with the pilot Peterborough SIB. For 
charities as service providers, this brings additional risk of reputational damage in 
the event of failure. 
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 Whilst one of the intentions behind the SIB mechanism is to better support 
the role of smaller charities in PbR contracts, this is yet to be achieved due to the 
complexity and scale associated with its use. 
 V. Additional Government Support 
for Contracting Using PbR 
 Despite the mixed evidence on eff ectiveness to date, the UK Government is keen 
to support the further development of contracting using PbR. For example, in 
2012, the Cabinet Offi  ce set up the  £ 20 million Social Outcomes Fund to provide 
a  ‘ top-up ’ contribution to outcomes-based commissions (SIBs or PbR) that aim 
to deal with complex and expensive social issues. 93 In the Spending Review and 
Autumn Statement 2015, the government pledged additional support for SIBs, 
investing  £ 105 million over the Parliament to help deal with issues including 
homelessness, poor mental health and youth unemployment. 94 It will be seen 
in the following two sections that, in addition to this important direct fi nancial 
support, the UK Government has introduced two additional initiatives to stimu-
late more interest in social impact investing and other PbR pilots, by way of the 
introduction of Social Investment Tax Relief in 2014 and legislative clarity around 
the ability of charities to make social investments in 2016. 
 A. Social Investment Tax Relief 
 Since 2014, 95 by way of Social Investment Tax Relief (SITR), individuals making 
eligible investments 96 in social enterprises can deduct 30 per cent of the cost of 
their investment from their income tax liability, either for the tax year in which 
the investment is made or the previous tax year. Th e investment must be held for 
a minimum period of three years for the relief to be retained. If individuals have 
chargeable gains in that tax year, they can also defer their capital gains tax (CGT) 
liability if they invest their gain in a qualifying social investment. Tax will instead 
be payable when the social investment is sold or redeemed. Investors also pay no 
CGT on any gain on the investment itself, but they must pay income tax in the 
Commissioning of Services by Charities in the Th ird Decade 251
  97  D  Floyd ,  ‘ WHAT A RELIEF! A review of Social Investment Tax Relief for charities and social 
enterprises ’ ( Social Investment Business ,  2019 ) . 
  98  HMRC ,  ‘ Enterprise Investment Scheme Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme and Social  Investment 
Tax Relief. Statistics on Companies raising funds ’ ( HMRC ,  May 2018 ) . 
  99  Ambition East Midlands and Aspire Gloucestershire were awarded PbR contracts with the Depart-
ment for Communities and Local Government and Cabinet Offi  ce. Th e investors would only receive 
their interest and capital payment if the organisations were successful in meeting their targets for 
 housing and supporting almost 500 vulnerable young people into education, employment and train-
ing. Th e capital raised enabled the charities to deliver the programmes ahead of being able to claim for 
outcome payments. See SB James,  ‘ Social investment tax relief for homelessness social impact bonds ’ 
( Th ird Sector , 5 February 2015). 
  100  D  Floyd ,  ‘ WHAT A RELIEF! A review of Social Investment Tax Relief for charities and social 
enterprises ’ ( Social Investment Business ,  2019 ) . 
  101  HM Treasury,  ‘ Social Investment Tax Relief: call for evidence ’ (HM Treasury, 24 April 2019). 
  102  See, eg,  Harries v Th e Church Commissioners for England [1992] 1 WLR 1241. 
normal way on any dividends or interest on the investment. Initially the maximum 
amount of investment eligible for relief was around  £ 300,000. Th is was raised to 
 £ 1.5 million in April 2017. Investments in companies (including SPVs) set up 
to carry out a SIB are eligible for SITR, provided that the company has received 
accreditation as a  ‘ Social Impact Contractor ’ from the Cabinet Offi  ce. 
 So far, use of SITR has been limited, and the data available on this use is also 
limited. 97 A report published by HM Revenue  & Customs in May 2018 98 shows a 
total of  £ 5.1 million raised by (up to) 35 charities and social enterprises over the 
fi rst three years of SITR, compared to a predicted fi gure of  £ 83.3 million  – based 
on Treasury estimates of the cost of the relief. Th e fi rst two SIBs to benefi t from 
SITR saw 15 per cent capital raised from individuals, with their predicted returns 
boosted from 7 per cent per annum to equivalent of 19.3 per cent per annum as a 
result. 99 However, a 2019 report 100 acknowledges that SITR has not been a major 
success to date and identifi es fi ve reason for this: lack of awareness from charities 
and social enterprises; slow pace of legislative change (to improve its attractiveness 
to investors); lack of fi tness for purpose (with wholesale copy and paste model 
from mainstream tax reliefs that apply for business investment schemes); process 
challenges (of proving and satisfying eligibility requirements); and lack of pipeline 
or mismatch between supply and demand (with investors in charities looking for 
opportunities that do not exist and vice versa). Positive change may follow a 2019 
government call for evidence on SITR eff ectiveness. 101 
 B. Making Social Investments and Fiduciary Duties 
of Trustees 
 While charitable foundation support for other charities has a long history, the 
extent to which charity law supports investments in social projects (as opposed to 
those purely aimed at fi nancial return) has oft en been questioned. 102 Th is has led 
to queries about charity trustees ’ ability to invest in SIBs. For example, one  investor 
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in the Peterborough SIB reported concerns that undertaking social investment 
(and accepting a blended return) may confl ict with fi duciary obligations of charity 
trustees to maximise fi nancial return on investment. 103 Th ere was a lack of clarity 
in the (then) charity investment guidance from the Charity Commission, 104 and 
some trustees were taking a cautious reading of it. Th is is despite the fact that the 
guidance (and the law upon which it was based) did not prohibit social investment. 
 Charities invest so as to further their charitable aims and, whilst it is recog-
nised that usually the best way to further those aims is to achieve the best fi nancial 
return within the level of risk considered to be acceptable, it is for trustees to decide 
whether or not this is the case, exercising their own discretion. Charity trustees 
may also determine that they want to use a charity ’ s assets directly to further its 
aims in a way that may also produce some fi nancial return for the charity. Th e 
justifi cation for making this kind of  ‘ programme-related investment ’ is to further 
the charity ’ s aims, rather than maximise fi nancial returns. In making this kind of 
investment, trustees are not bound by the legal framework for fi nancial invest-
ment, because their decision is about applying assets directly in furtherance of 
the charity ’ s aims. Alternatively,  ‘ mixed motive investment ’ where the investment 
is for the specifi c purposes of both furthering a charity ’ s aims and generating a 
fi nancial return, is also acceptable. 
 Despite the fact that the law already facilitated both these kinds of investment, 
because of concerns and reluctance on the part of some trustees to accept this, 
as part of the government ’ s social investment strategy, 105 the Charities (Protec-
tion and Social Investment) Act 2016 introduced a statutory power for charities to 
make social investments. 106 Whilst it could be argued that this was unnecessary, 
and potentially undermines the pre-existing permissive position at common law, it 
does provide welcome 107 clarifi cation of charities ’ ability to make social investment, 
and clarifi es the duties of charity trustees when authorising social investment. Th is 
is defi ned as a  ‘ relevant act ’ 108 of a charity which is carried out  ‘ with a view to both 
directly furthering the charity ’ s purposes and achieving a fi nancial return for the 
charity ’. Th e new legislation does not alter or override trustees ’ general common 
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law duties, but introduces new statutory duties that apply to all charity trustees 
when making decisions about social investments. 109 Th ese duties apply in place 
of statutory duties in the Trustee Act 2000, which relate specifi cally to fi nancial 
investments. Before exercising any power to make social investments, trustees 
must: consider whether in all the circumstances any advice about the proposed 
social investment ought to be obtained; obtain and consider any advice which they 
conclude ought to be obtained; and, satisfy themselves that it is in the interests 
of the charity to make the social investment, having regard to the benefi t they 
expect it to achieve for the charity, by directly furthering the charity ’ s purposes 
and achieving a fi nancial return. Trustees must also review their charity ’ s social 
investments from time to time. 
 When introducing the new power in the House of Lords, Lord Bridges of 
 Headley said that the intention was to  ‘ help charities to make social investments 
so that they can fulfi l their mission in new and innovative ways ’ and he said 
that it would  ‘ give charities the confi dence and certainty to invest in this grow-
ing sector ’. 110 It is diffi  cult at this stage to measure the impact of this power. Not 
long aft er the power was introduced, one law fi rm advised a Christian mission 
charity on how to apply the new power, and the chair of its trustee board later 
commented: 111 
 [Our charity] has been committed to social investments since 2008, and as trustees we 
were used to dealing with the legal framework that existed before the new power. Once 
we understood the background and intention of the new power, it proved to be a solid 
platform for our considerations and helped us think creatively and confi dently about 
how we could use [our charity ’ s] resources in the most impactful way. 
 If more charities were given such advice and then acted similarly, the new power 
could have signifi cant potential. Early signs are promising. Data published in 2018 
on foundation giving trends 112 note that in 2016 – 17, 34 (11 per cent) of the top 
300 charitable foundations identifi ed programme-related or social investments in 
the balance sheet or notes to their accounts and that these were worth just over 
 £ 120 million  – a real annual increase in value of 18 per cent. 
 VI. Charities in the New Contracting Environment  – 
Towards the Future 
 Having examined the PbR contracting environment and the challenges that it 
raises for charitable service providers in particular, this fi nal section will assess the 
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realistic chances of their successful participation, looking towards the future and 
some potentially positive developments on the horizon. 
 Whilst PbR as a concept, where charities are paid for what they achieve rather 
than what they do, may seem on fi rst sight instinctively attractive, it has been seen 
that current commissioning processes continue to be a major threat to the survival 
of smaller charities that may well fi nd it diffi  cult to negotiate this new funding 
model. Th e importance of this conclusion cannot be overestimated, bearing in 
mind that the vast majority of charities are small. 113 Th ere is a frequent lack of 
recognition by funders of the true costs to charities of delivering the vital services 
being commissioned. In short, the fi nancial structures of PbR have the eff ect of 
excluding the expertise of many charitable providers, either because they choose 
not to participate or are unable to do so. Th e amount of upfront capital required to 
set up and sustain services until payment is achieved can be a challenge in a sector 
where reserves are limited, and the additional risk of non-payment may create a 
barrier for charity trustees, who must be prudent with charity funds. Th e account 
of the Peterborough SIB (and its interruption due to external policy changes in the 
form of a national restructure of probation services) reminds us that the impact on 
programme outcomes of the unpredictable dynamic, extraneous policy environ-
ment and political climate should not be underestimated. 
 Th e contract culture environment per se is diffi  cult for charities to negotiate. 
It has been seen that PbR adds a further layer of complexity and potential legal 
liability where the stakes are very high. PbR demands certain fi nancial skills from 
providers which may not have been required before from charity trustees. Smaller 
charities will struggle even more to access these skills. Where charities are being 
funded through PbR contracts, they will also need suffi  ciently sophisticated data 
management systems in place to ensure that the specifi ed necessary results do in 
fact trigger requests for payments. 
 It has also been seen that the funding structures of PbR contracts, with the 
need for upfront absorption of costs, may well exclude smaller charities that oper-
ate with minimal or non-existent reserves with little access to working capital to 
invest in up-front costs. Traditionally, the retail banks have been reluctant to lend 
to charities because of low returns, the insecurity of contract-based work and the 
general risk profi le of the sector. 
 Whatever payment structures are used, they must off er suffi  cient funds for 
working with all charity benefi ciaries, no matter how complex, sustained, or 
expensive their needs might be. Th is will help to guard against practices such as 
 ‘ creaming and parking ’, discussed earlier in the context of the Work Programme. 
One way to use PbR to really incentivise providers to work with those with more 
complex needs may be to move away from a binary approach to outcomes and to 
introduce staged payments where  ‘ mini ’ targets trigger payments for progress as 
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well as ultimate outcomes. 114 For example, where the ultimate outcome may be 
that an unemployed person fi nds employment, an interim payment could be made 
if that person completes a training course. 
 Looking towards the future, the government ’ s stated vision for public services 
is encouraging at least. Th e 2018 Civil Society Strategy talks of  ‘ collaborative 
commissioning ’ and states: 115 
 Th is means that in the future, local stakeholders will be involved in an equal and mean-
ingful way in commissioning and all the resources of a community, including but not 
confi ned to public funding, will be deployed to tackle the community ’ s challenges. 
People will be trusted to co-design the services they use. 
 Th ere are also plans for a welcome return for increased use of grant funding along-
side contracted funding for charities. A blended funding model will introduce into 
commissioning a more proportionate attitude to risk. Th e Strategy notes: 116 
 In addition to Social Impact Bonds, and to social impact investment  … the government 
wishes to broaden the range of funding options for community initiatives. Th is includes 
a revival of grant-making  –  “ Grants 2.0 ”  – to refl ect the fact that grants can combine 
fl exibility with the accountability and performance rigour of a contract, and also bring 
 “ additionality ” , such as philanthropic or in-kind investment. 
 Grant funding is particularly suited to facilitating innovation from charitable 
providers, something which PbR contracts have largely been unable to realise. 117 
Even within a commissioning scenario, a hybrid model, with an element of upfront 
funding together with remaining payments being triggered by the attainment of 
pre-agreed results, would reduce risk and incentivise innovation. Th is element of 
grant funding may better support diversity of provision and give the space and 
capacity to trial and test ideas. 
 A further positive development on the horizon is that there are plans to 
strengthen the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012, which currently requires 
commissioners to consider the economic, social and environmental, and wider 
value a contract can bring. It is intended to extend its requirements in central 
government to ensure all major procurements explicitly evaluate social value where 
appropriate, rather than just  ‘ consider ’ it, as is currently the requirement. 118 Th is 
will assist charities when competing for contracts and should shift  the balance of 
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power somewhat when charities are involved as sub-contractors in supply chains 
in which the prime contractor ’ s social credentials are less obvious. 
 Another tool for charities to resort to in the future may be the Compact, 119 
which is currently almost defunct. Th e Compact is the agreement between the 
government and the voluntary sector that outlines best practice for partnership 
working. It talks of government using diverse funding models so as to enable 
smaller organisations to become involved in delivering services where they are 
best placed to achieve the desired outcomes. It also requires prime contractors to 
adhere to the terms of the Compact in allocating risk proportionately. It has not 
been renewed since 2010, but a revitalised agreement 120 may well support a better 
funding environment for charities. 
 VII. Conclusion 
 Th e question for debate was whether PbR contracts in general, and, in particu-
lar, the use of SIBs, are an eff ective means by which charities might be funded 
to deliver public services. Arguments made in this chapter in responding to this 
question and backed up by evidence suggest that PbR contracts are inherently 
risky for charities. Measures introduced to support charities and other non-profi t 
providers wishing to use their expertise to support their benefi ciaries through the 
provision of public services have not as of yet alleviated the diffi  culties presented 
by PbR contracts. Th ese diffi  culties are exacerbated for small charities which make 
up the majority of the sector. 
 Perhaps in the future charities will take their rightful place in the contracting 
landscape, operating as well-funded providers of social and other services in a 
domain in which they retain expertise and are able to deploy it to maximum eff ect. 
If and when it becomes common practice for commissioners to enter into pre-
procurement dialogue with providers, co-design payment models and outcomes, 
and use the learning from this collaboration to inform and improve future 
commissioning strategies, lessons will have fi nally been learned from decades of 
the contract culture. 
 
